manaflow - Moses Yebei

The Problem

Running multiple coding agents (Claude Code, Codex CLI, Gemini CLI) against the same codebase is chaotic. Each agent needs an isolated environment, a way to show its work, and a path to merge results without stepping on the others. Manaflow wraps each agent in its own VS Code workspace with a live preview and git diff, so parallel work stays verifiable.

What This Does

Manaflow orchestrates coding agent CLIs in parallel, each in an isolated VS Code workspace. The client is an Electron app (apps/client/electron/main/index.ts) with a React frontend (apps/client/src/app.tsx). The server (apps/server/) manages Docker containers and repositories, while a worker (apps/worker/src/index.ts) executes agent tasks.

The repo is five self-contained projects: apps/ (client, server, worker, edge-router, preview-proxy), packages/ (shared code, Convex backend), scripts/ (PR review, snapshot tooling), crates/ (Rust native modules), and evals/. A heatmap diff viewer (apps/client/src/components/heatmap-diff-viewer/) color-codes risky changes during PR review.

How It Is Wired

Execution starts at apps/client/electron/main/index.ts (function handleCmuxProtocol) and apps/worker/src/index.ts (function createTerminal). The worker's createTerminal reaches 38 functions and routes through onData -> handleData -> classify -> handleTlsTunnel, eventually calling getCertDataForHost -> generateSerialNumber — a crypto operation two hops from the entry point. The client's task-run-preview-proxy.ts makes outbound network calls and performs secret generation, making it the most effect-heavy file.

The internal call graph shows 2,648 resolved edges. log is called from 53 places and fetch from 50 — these are the highest-blast-radius functions. apps/server/src/socket-handlers sits in a circular dependency with 30 imports, which will complicate refactoring. The Convex generated API (packages/convex/convex/_generated/server) is a hub module with 73 dependents; any change there ripples widely.

How To Use It

The README documents a macOS download but no CLI install commands (they're commented out). The repo has a Dockerfile, .devcontainer/, and GitHub Actions for CI. Clone and explore:

git clone https://github.com/moses-y/manaflow
cd manaflow
# Check apps/client/package.json and apps/server/ for build scripts
# .env.example shows required environment variables

Configuration lives in .env.example and packages/convex/.env.convex. The devcontainer (docker-compose.convex.yml) suggests a Convex backend is required. Setup steps beyond that aren't documented in the README.

Real-World Use

A team runs three agents on a feature branch: one refactoring the API layer, one writing tests, one updating the frontend. Each gets an isolated Docker container via apps/server/src/repositoryManager.ts, which handles workspace setup and cleanup. The localCloudSync.ts file manages content hashing and ignore patterns to keep workspaces in sync. Results land as PRs through apps/server/src/ghApi.ts, which wraps the GitHub API client.

Code Health & Issues

Static analysis found 328 findings (109 high, 219 medium). The measured issues:

High - Hub modules - packages/convex/convex/_generated/server has 73 dependents; churn here is high-blast-radius
High - Import cycles - 9 files including packages/shared/src/agentConfig.ts participate in circular imports
High - Oversized files - apps/server/src/vscode/DockerVSCodeInstance.ts at 1,398 lines; repositoryManager.ts is close behind
High - Deep nesting - 29 files with max indentation depth 8, including heatmap-diff-viewer.tsx
Medium - Broad exception handling - scripts/snapshot/context.py and exec.py swallow exceptions
Medium - High branching density - apps/www/scripts/pr-review/diff-utils.ts has 40 branch points over 122 lines

The code health audit flags two high-severity items: third-party GitHub Actions are pinned to mutable tags (oven-sh/setup-bun@v2, jlumbroso/free-disk-space@main), and a .env.convex file is committed — rotate whatever it holds. CI lacks a dependency vulnerability scan and least-privilege token permissions.

The Bottom Line

Manaflow is a serious attempt at parallel agent orchestration with real engineering behind it — isolated workspaces, live previews, and PR tooling. The codebase is young: oversized files, import cycles, and a committed .env need attention before production use. Teams already running multiple coding agents will find it useful; others should wait for the hygiene issues to clear.

What the analyser found

Deployment readiness

6/7

Container image
CI pipeline
Lockfile committed
Test suite
README
License
No committed secrets

Composition

1,730 files

TypeScript741
TSX265
Shell108
JSON102
Rust89
Go53

ReactNext.jsExpressTailwindDocker

Architecture

Top-level areas of the codebase, sized by module count. Arrows show how many imports cross from one area into another.

graph TD g0["apps 687 modules"] g1["packages 281 modules"] g2["scripts 79 modules"] g3["evals 10 modules"] g4["(root) 5 modules"] g2 -->|5| g0 g0 -->|1| g1

Module dependencies

The 10 most depended-upon modules of 1,062, from static import analysis. Red outline marks a module in an import cycle.

graph LR n0_vex_convex__generated_server["server"] n1_vex_convex_users_utils_index["index"] n2_convex_convex__generated_api["api"] n3_packages_convex__shared_team["team"] n4__server_src_utils_fileLogger["fileLogger"] n5_es_convex__shared_convex_env["convex-env"] n6_erver_src_utils_convexClient["convexClient"] n7_pps_www_lib_utils_get_convex["get-convex"] n8_kages_shared_src_agentConfig["agentConfig"] n9_scripts_pr_review_core_types["types"] n3_packages_convex__shared_team --> n0_vex_convex__generated_server n1_vex_convex_users_utils_index --> n0_vex_convex__generated_server classDef cyc stroke:#ef4444,stroke-width:2px; class n8_kages_shared_src_agentConfig cyc;

Findings

LowSecret-shaped paths present; the code-health audit confirms or clears them apps/www/scripts/hello-stack-secrets.ts

What would stop me shipping this

Ranked by severity × confidence × production reach. Reach is the honest discriminator across a collection that is mostly other people's code: the same finding matters more in something that ships.

high2

medium5

low1

Pin third-party GitHub Actions to a commit SHAhigh8 occurrences

.github/workflows

oven-sh/setup-bun@v2, jlumbroso/free-disk-space@main, docker/setup-qemu-action@v3, docker/setup-buildx-action@v3

A tag can be moved, so the action running with your token and secrets is whatever its owner last pushed; this is how tj-actions/changed-files leaked secrets from thousands of repos.

Fix: Replace each @vN with the 40-character commit SHA, keep # vN as a comment, and let Dependabot bump the SHAs.

Remove the committed .env and rotate what it holdshigh

packages/convex/.env.convex

A tracked .env is the most common route for a working key to reach a public clone, and it is the file the app actually loads, so the value is usually live.

Fix: git rm --cached the file, add it to .gitignore, rotate every credential it names, commit a .env.example with empty values.

Declare least-privilege permissions for GITHUB_TOKENmedium

.github/workflows/checks.yml

1 workflow(s) declare no permissions, 1 of them reference secrets

With no declaration the token inherits the repository default, so any injected step can push commits or mint releases from inside your own CI.

Fix: Add permissions: contents: read at the top of the workflow and widen per job only where needed.

Enable Dependabot or Renovatemedium

58 manifest(s), no update bot configured

Without a bot a published advisory sits unpatched until someone audits by hand, which across 1,322 repositories means never.

Fix: Commit .github/dependabot.yml covering the repo ecosystems plus github-actions.

Pin the container base image by digestmedium

.devcontainer/Dockerfile

node:24-bookworm

An untagged or mutable base means today's build and last month's contain different libc and a different CVE set, with no record of which shipped.

Fix: Use image:tag@sha256:<digest> and enable Dependabot's docker ecosystem.

Gate pull requests on a dependency vulnerability scanmedium

.github/workflows

no dependency scan in CI

This is the one gate that would catch a known-vulnerable package before it reaches a build, and no repository in the sample had it.

Fix: Add dependency-review-action on pull_request, or osv-scanner on push and a schedule.

Add a pre-commit secret gatemedium

a secret-shaped file is tracked and no repo-level gate is visible

Without a gate the same class of leak recurs on the next commit, so a leak finding is the symptom and this is the cause.

Fix: Add a pre-commit hook scanning staged content, and enable push protection.

Set timeout-minutes on the workflow jobslow4 occurrences

.github/workflows/checks.yml

4 workflow(s) declare no job timeout

A wedged step runs to the six-hour platform default, which on a two-hourly schedule means three runs overlap behind it.

Fix: Add timeout-minutes with a realistic bound to each job.

Checked deterministically against the repository tree and a bounded set of its files: committed credentials, unpinned actions and base images, missing lockfiles and update bots, workflows that discard failures, published advisories against the declared dependencies, runtime configuration, licensing and notebook reproducibility. No language model is involved in this section.